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Abstract
This paper examines how attractive investment opportunities available to
temporary migrants in their country of origin a⁄ect their saving behavior and
the optimal duration of stay abroad. The model predicts an inverse U-shaped
relationship between migration duration and the expected rate of return on
repatriated savings. A higher rate provides an incentive to go back earlier and
consume less abroad, while it can also trigger emigration aimed at generating
the savings required for investment after return. At a more general level,
the paper illustrates how the behavior of temporary migrants re￿ ects the
interaction between their preferences and the opportunities available in the
labor and capital markets of both countries.
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11 Introduction
It is widely recognized that imperfections in the capital markets of developing
countries impede the establishment and growth of small businesses. While
the required initial investment in a wide range of informal-sector activities
can be as low as one or two hundred dollars, even such small amounts are
out of reach for most of the population in the developing countries. One
way of reacting to the imperfections in the capital markets is by migrating
temporarily: Going to work for a higher wage abroad, accumulating sav-
ings, and then returning to the source country to invest in a small business,
purchase livestock, agricultural land or other productive assets.
A number of recent studies show that temporary migration is indeed an ef-
fective means of surmounting credit market imperfections. Mesnard￿ s (2004)
analysis of a data set on Tunisian return migrants reveals that they faced
di¢ culties in getting credit to invest in self-employment activities after re-
turning to Tunisia. An overwhelming majority of them relied mainly on their
own savings accumulated abroad. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) present
similar ￿ndings on the basis of a sample of Turkish immigrants returning from
Germany. They ￿nd that 51.1% of them started microenterprises within four
years after returning to Turkey. Only 1.2% reported bank credit as a major
source of ￿nance. For the case of Mexico, Woodru⁄ and Zenteno (2007)
￿nd that remittances are an important source of ￿nancing for small-business
activities. Durand, Kandel, Parrado and Massey (1996), Escobar-Patapi and
Martinez-Castellanos (1991), and Taylor (1987) discuss the role of migration
and remittances as a response to the lack of access to credit for Mexican fam-
ilies of modest means. Other contributions, including Ilahi (1999), Lucas
(1987), Massey and Parrado (1998), McCormick and Wahba (2001) empha-
size, as well, the role of savings accumulated abroad in enabling returnees to
initiate small business activities or undertake investments that enhance the
productivity of the family￿ s farm.1
1Some of these empirical studies also show that higher accumulated savings while
abroad are associated with a higher probability of entering self-employment relative to
wage labor [e.g., Mesnard (2004), Ilahi (1999), and Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)],
while Mesnard and Ravaillon (2006) ￿nd that wealth increases the probability of start-
ing up a business, but with diminishing returns over most of their data set on Tunisian
migrants. See Docquier and Rapoport (2006) for a survey of this literature.
2Recognizing this well-documented link between savings accumulated in
the host country and self-employment activities of returning migrants in the
source country, this paper provides a theoretical analysis of how investment
opportunities at home a⁄ect the behavior of temporary immigrants while
they live and work abroad. The model employed is similar to that devel-
oped by Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988) for the purpose of simultaneously de-
termining the duration of foreign stay and saving behavior of temporary
immigrant workers.2 The present study is an important extension of the
Djaji· c-Milbourne analysis in that it takes into account not only the interna-
tional wage di⁄erential as the driving force behind migration decisions, but
also the international di⁄erential in the expected rates of return on capital.
Migration and asset accumulation abroad can transform a migrant from be-
ing endowed only with labor (and hence attracted by the opportunities to
sell labor services abroad) to becoming relatively well endowed with capital
(and hence attracted by the opportunities to sell the services of capital back
in the source country). Taking into consideration di⁄erences in the rates of
return on capital at home and abroad is therefore essential to understanding
a migrant￿ s decisions concerning saving behavior, duration of stay abroad
and return migration.
Mesnard (2004) takes an important step in this direction. In the context
of a very simple and elegant model, she looks at the duration of stay and
consumption behavior of migrants, as well as their occupational choice after
return, under the assumptions that there is no discounting (rates of inter-
est and time preference are zero) and that investment projects available to
returnees are lumpy (a certain minimum initial investment is required, ￿ la
Banerjee and Newman (1993), in order to initiate a small business in the
source country). Migrant behavior in that setting is fundamentally driven
by the objective to accumulate the minimum required savings. The present
study assumes, instead, that migrants are not constrained to accumulate a
speci￿c stock of assets in order to start a business after return. They choose
the scale of their investment as a function of their preferences, including time
preference, and the opportunities available in the labor and capital markets
of both countries.3
2The behavior of utility-maximizing temporary migrants with exogenously determined
duration of stay abroad has been examined by Djaji· c (1989), with the analysis extended
to the case of uncertainty concerning the prospect of return by Galor and Stark (1991).
3As noted by Woodru⁄ and Zenteno (2007), a wide range of investment opportunities
3Another related study is that of Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), which
uses numerical simulation to illustrate the behavior of migrants, including
migration duration and the planned post-return activity. They simplify the
analysis by assuming that if the migrant chooses self-employment upon re-
turn, the repatriated savings, A, are invested in an activity that generates a
constant ￿ ow of income, rA, for the rest of the agent￿ s lifetime. There is no
possibility of selling o⁄ parts of the investment over time so as to augment
consumption. At the same time, it is assumed that the investment depreci-
ates instantaneously at the end of the planning horizon.4 I assume, instead,
that the returnee invests in an enterprise that can be gradually sold o⁄ to
support the optimal consumption program and I focus much more explicitly
on the duration of stay and consumption behavior of migrants rather than
on their occupational choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The problem con-
fronting a potential migrant is presented and analyzed in Section 2. He or
she faces a relatively high wage abroad, where labor is scarce, and a rel-
atively high return on capital at home, where labor is abundant. In the
presence of constraints on credit, taking advantage of opportunities in both
the labor and capital markets of both economies, requires of the migrant to
work abroad and save, then return to the source country and invest the accu-
mulated savings at a high rate of return. From the theoretical perspective,
the key questions facing the migrant in that setting are the following: 1)
How long should he or she work abroad, if at all, before returning to the
source country with the accumulated savings, 2) what fraction of the foreign
wage should be saved, and 3) at what rate should the accumulated assets be
consumed after return.
E⁄ects on the migrant￿ s behavior of changes in the source-country rate of
return on investment and other exogenous variables, such as wages of both
countries, are examined in Section 3. The analysis reveals an inverse U-
shaped relationship between the optimal duration of stay abroad and the
expected rate of return on investment in the source country. Moreover,
are open to returning migrants, some requiring only a small amount of initial capital, while
others call for larger accumulated savings.
4These assumptions are perfectly suitable for an analysis of investment in human cap-
ital, but less so when it comes to physical capital.
4an increase in the expected rate of return can trigger emigration aimed at
generating the savings required for investment after return, while it also
provides an incentive to go back earlier and save at a higher rate abroad.
These e⁄ects are illustrated in Section 4 with the aid of numerical simulations
using a speci￿c utility function. The role of preferences and how they interact
with market opportunities in in￿ uencing temporary migration is discussed in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the
main ￿ndings.
2 The Model
Let us assume that a credit-constrained migrant leaves the source country at
the age of 0 to work abroad until the age ￿ at the wage w￿. While abroad,
s/he earns the foreign rate of return r￿ on accumulated savings. After
return to the source country, s/he works for the wage w < w￿ and invests
the repatriated savings in an activity that yields a rate of return r > r￿.5 In
5While there is very little empirical evidence on the rates of return on small business
investments and self-employment activities of returning migrants, it is safe to assume that
they can be considerably higher than the return on savings in the host country. In a study
on remitting behavior of migrant labor in the South African gold mining industry, Penny
(1986) ￿nds that, in the absence of more attractive alternatives, most of the investment
of migrant households is in the form of livestock. For livestock holders in the migrant-
sending areas of Lesotho, Swallow and Brokken (1987) calculate the private rate of return
on capital invested in cattle to be 9.4 percent, 8.7 percent for sheep, and 5.7 percent for
goats. In the case of Egypt, Adams (1991) ￿nds that in the 1980￿ s, migrants￿remittances
were mostly invested in land. He calculates the real rate of return on agricultural land in
the study area to have averaged 9.5 percent per year over the period 1980-86.
A number of recent studies provide much higher estimates of rates of return on invest-
ment in small business activity in developing countries. De Mel, McKenzie and Woodru⁄
(2007b) ￿nd the average return on capital of small and informal ￿rms in Sri Lanka to
be 68% per year. Udry and Anagal (2006) estimate returns on capital in traditional
small-scale agricultural production in Ghana to be 50% per year. Using Mexican data,
McKenzie and Woodru⁄(2006) observe rates of return on capital in small urban enterprises
of around 15% per month. Measuring small enterprise pro￿ts in developing countries is a
di¢ cult task, however, as the vast majority of such businesses do not keep records and, if
surveyed, are likely to understate revenues and overstate expenses [see de Mel, McKenzie
and Woodru⁄ (2007a)].
5order to realize this return, we assume that the migrant must be physically
present in the source country to monitor the investment and assure e¢ ciency
in the operations of the enterprise. This monitoring activity still allows the
migrant to earn, in addition to the rate of return r on his or her investment,
the market wage of the source country by working in one￿ s own enterprise
or another establishment. We assume that foreign investors are not able
to take advantage of small-business investment opportunities in the source
country as they lack local information and networks which play a crucial role
in enabling an investor to realize the rate of return r.
The wage, investment income, and gradual liquidation of asset holdings
after return serve to ￿nance consumption over the remainder of the planning
horizon from age ￿ to T. The problem facing the migrant is to maximize V,
the discounted utility from consumption abroad and at home, by choosing
the consumption rate at each point in time and the optimal length of stay ￿








t is the rate of consumption at time t while abroad, ct is the rate
of consumption after returning to the country of origin, ￿ is the migrant￿ s
constant rate of time preference, and the utility functions are concave and
twice di⁄erentiable. Following Hill (1987) and Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988),
I shall assume that the migrant prefers to consume in the source country
rather than in the host country in the sense that u￿0(x) < u0(x); 8x > 0
(i.e., the marginal utility of consumption at home is always higher than that
associated with the same rate of consumption abroad).6
Utility is maximized subject to the constraint that A, the value of savings
accumulated abroad is equal to the excess of discounted consumption over
wage income after return. For simplicity, we shall assume that w￿;w;r￿ and
6As pointed out by Hill (1987) and Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988), there is evidence that
migrants prefer to live and consume in their countries of origin because of the presence of
family members as well as climate, culture, and life-style to which they are accustomed.
Let R represent these other factors which, in addition to consumption, enter a migrant￿ s
utility function. If c and R are Edgeworth complements, so that marginal utility of
consumption is increasing in R, and if R is higher in the source country than it is abroad,
one would observe that migrants have a higher preference for consumption at home in the
sense described in the text.
6r are all constant and the cost of migration is zero.7 Using the date of return
￿ as the point of reference, and noting that the rate of return on assets in the
host country (r￿) di⁄ers from that of the source country (r), we may write
the budget constraint as
(2) A =
R ￿




￿ (w ￿ ptct)e￿r(t￿￿)dt;
where pt and p￿
t are the prices at time t of the single consumption good
at home and abroad, measured in terms of the numeraire, say a unit of gold.
The time 0 value of assets accumulated abroad is A0 = Ae￿r￿￿. De￿ning the









0 (w￿ ￿ p￿
tc￿
t)e￿r￿tdt + e￿r￿￿ R T
￿ (w ￿ ptct)e￿r(t￿￿)dt]:
The ￿rst order conditions are
(3) @L











+￿(r ￿ r￿)e￿r￿￿ R T
￿ (w ￿ ptct)e￿r(t￿￿)dt = 0;
and the budget constraint (2). These four equations enable us to solve
for the values of the key endogenous variables: ct;c￿
t;￿; and the Lagrangian
multiplier, ￿:
7Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988) examine explicitly the role of migration costs in in￿ u-
encing consumption behavior and duration of stay. They ￿nd that an increase in such
costs lengthens a migrant￿ s stay abroad. The present model generates the same outcome
if migration costs are taken into account.
An interesting extension, proposed by a referee, would be to assume that a credit-
constrained migrant needs to accumulate savings before migration [rather than borrow at
the interest rate r, as in Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988)], in order to ￿nance migration. In
such a model there would be an additional, initial phase of asset accumulation at home,
with the opportunities available to the migrant in the subsequent two phases (i.e., employ-
ment abroad and entrepreneurial activity after return) a⁄ecting both the duration of and
the saving rate in the ￿rst phase. While such an analysis would constitute an interesting
extension of the present model, a satisfactory treatment would require considerably more
space and would distract the reader from the main point of the paper.
73 Analysis of the Migrant￿ s Behavior
To simplify the analysis and the notation, let us assume that the migrant￿ s
rate of time preference ￿ = r￿ and that pt = p￿
t = 1.8 We can then write eqs.
(3)-(5) as
(6) u0(ct) = ￿e￿(r￿r￿)(t￿￿);
(7) u￿0(c￿
t) = ￿;
(8) u(c￿) ￿ u￿(c￿
￿) + ￿(r ￿ r￿)A = ￿[(w￿ ￿ c￿
￿) ￿ (w ￿ c￿)]:
With ￿ = r￿, we observe in eq. (7) that the marginal utility of con-
sumption abroad is constant. The rate of consumption abroad, c￿
t; is there-
fore also a constant, c￿. In addition, eqs. (6) and (7) imply that upon
return to the source country at time ￿, consumption jumps to a higher
rate (re￿ ecting the migrant￿ s preference for consumption at home), while
u0(c￿+) = u￿0(c￿
￿￿), so that the marginal utility of consumption is a continu-
ous function of time when the migrant switches from the foreign to the home
consumption stream.9 With the aid of (6) and (7), we may therefore write
c￿ = ￿(c￿) > c￿; where ￿
0(c￿) = u￿00(c￿
￿)=u00(c￿) > 0: Moreover, eq. (6)
shows that the marginal utility of post-return consumption is declining over
time at the proportional rate r ￿ r￿. This implies that from time ￿ to T,
consumption is increasing at the proportional rate equal to the product of
r ￿ r￿ and the elasticity of intertemporal consumption substitution (ICS).
We may therefore write
(9) ct = ￿(c￿)e( r￿r￿
￿ )(t￿￿);
where ￿ = ￿u00(ct)ct=u0(ct) > 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility with
respect to consumption, assumed constant, and 1/￿ is the elasticity of ICS.
Eq. (8) sets the cost, in terms of forgone utility, of staying an extra unit of
time abroad equal to the bene￿t. This makes the migrant indi⁄erent between
staying and returning to the source country, as must be the case when the
8For the in￿ uence of international price di⁄erentials on the consumption-saving behav-
ior of temporary migrants, see Djaji· c (1989).
9c￿
￿￿ and c￿+ are the consumption rates just before and just after time ￿:
8date of return, ￿; is chosen optimally. The cost of staying another instant (or
the gain from returning a moment sooner) is the di⁄erence between u(c￿) and
u￿ (c￿
￿); plus the utility value of (r ￿ r￿)A; which is the cost of waiting to
invest the assets accumulated abroad at the relatively higher source-country
rate of return. The bene￿t of staying longer, on the right-hand side of (8), is
simply the utility value of the increase in wealth, due to accumulation rather
than decumulation of assets associated with staying an extra unit of time
abroad.10
Eq. (8) may be rewritten with the aid of (7) and (9) to de￿ne
(10) G =
u[￿(c￿)]￿u￿(c￿)
u￿0(c￿) + (r ￿ r￿)A ￿ [w￿ ￿ c￿ ￿ w + ￿(c￿)] = 0;
as the net gain (measured in terms of the numeraire, rather than utility)
from returning to the source country a moment sooner. At the optimally
chosen ￿;G = 0: Moreover, with the aid of (9), the budget constraint (2)
may be written in an integrated form as the di⁄erence, B, between assets




r￿ (er￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿
￿(c￿)
g (eg(T￿￿) ￿ 1) + w
r (1 ￿ e￿r(T￿￿)) = 0;
where g = r￿r￿
￿ ￿ r is the proportional rate of growth of the discounted
(time-￿) value of the post-return consumption rate, ct.
The system of eqs. (10) and (11) de￿nes the internal temporary migration
equilibrium. It yields the solutions for the two key variables of the model:
the rate of consumption abroad, c￿, and the duration of stay in the foreign
country, ￿; as functions of the exogenous variables, including w￿;w; and r:
Using Gx and Bx to represent @G=@x and @B=@x; where x = c￿;￿;w;w￿ and
r (these partial derivatives are presented and examined in the Appendix), we
can write eqs. (10) and (11) in di⁄erentiated form as
10An interesting implication of (8) is that a positive rate-of-return di⁄erential in favor
of the source country increases the cost of postponing return migration. In that sense
it contributes to a reduction in the duration of a migrant￿ s stay in the host country in
relation to the benchmark case, examined by Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988), where r = r￿.














￿Gwdw ￿ Gw￿dw￿ ￿ Grdr
￿Bwdw ￿ Bw￿dw￿ ￿ Brdr
￿
:
The determinant of the matrix of coe¢ cients ￿ = Gc￿B￿ ￿ Bc￿G￿ is
unambiguously positive if Gc￿ > 0: As we shall see below, Gc￿ is indeed
positive in the neighborhood of an equilibrium so that ￿ > 0.11 The system























with the elements in the numerators of these expressions presented and
evaluated in the Appendix. Our ￿ndings can be summarized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 1: a) An increase in w results in a downward shift of the
migrant￿ s time pro￿le of consumption and a decrease in the optimal length
of stay abroad. b) An increase in w* results in an upward shift of the
migrant￿ s time pro￿le of consumption, but it has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the
optimal length of stay abroad. c) An increase in r results in a downward
shift of the migrant￿ s time pro￿le of consumption and it has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on the optimal length of stay abroad.
As explained in the Appendix, the ambiguous sign of d￿=dw￿ in (14 )
stems from the interaction between the income and substitution e⁄ects aris-
ing from an increase in w￿. Discussion of the other results, including the
11Moreover, on the dynamic assumptions that the migrant increases (decreases) c￿ when
B > 0(B < 0) and lowers (raises) ￿ if G > 0(G < 0), stability of the equilibrium requires
that ￿ > 0:
10ambiguous e⁄ect of r on ￿; is provided in the next section along with numer-
ical simulations that help to illustrate the ￿ndings.
4 A Speci￿c Utility Function









where ￿ > 1 re￿ ects the migrant￿ s preference for consumption at home.12
We shall restrict our analysis to the case of ￿ <1. This guarantees that utility
is positive and that the ￿rst-order conditions (6)-(8) are consistent with the
assumption that the migrant prefers to consume in the source country.13 Eq.
(9) now becomes




and the key eqs. (10) and (11) can be written as
(10￿ ) G = c￿ ￿
1￿￿(￿
1
￿ ￿ 1) + (w ￿ w￿) + r￿r￿
r￿ (w￿ ￿ c￿)(er￿￿ ￿ 1) = 0
12To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies that provide estimates of ￿. A way
of determining what might be realistic magnitudes of ￿ is by asking what would ￿ have
to be if we are to observe permanent migration when w￿ is only 3 to 5 times higher than
w, as is typically needed to trigger large-scale migration. When w￿=w = 3; it is simple to
calculate on the basis of (19) that for ￿ in the range from .95 to .80, for example, the value
of ￿ that makes one indi⁄erent between migrating permanently and staying at home is in
the range between ￿ = 1:05 and ￿ = 1:26; while for w￿=w = 5; the corresponding range
is from 1.08 to 1.38. These magnitudes can be interpreted to represent an upper bound
on what might be a realistic value of ￿: In the numerical simulations below, I use values
of ￿ in the range between 1.1 and 1.5. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) use a value of
￿ =3 in their simulation exercise, which is very much higher than what I consider to be
plausible.
13For the functional form given in (19), if ￿ > 1; u(c￿) ￿ u￿(c￿
￿) < 0 at the rates of
consumption abroad and at home that satisfy the ￿rst-order condition u0(c￿￿) = u￿0(c￿
￿+):
This implies a drop (rather than an increase) in utility of consumption at the moment of
return to the source country. We therefore examine only the case of ￿<1. The assumption
that ￿ < 1 is also consistent with the empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal
consumption substitution (1/￿) reported by Hansen and Singleton (1982), in the range
between 1 and 1.5, and of Favero (2005), who reports an estimate of around 1.





g (eg(T￿￿) ￿1)￿ w
r (e￿r(T￿￿) ￿1) = 0:
Note that the partial derivatives of G and B with respect to c￿ and ￿ are
now simply
(20) Gc￿ = ￿
1￿￿(￿
1







(21) G￿ = (r ￿ r￿)(w￿ ￿ c￿)er￿￿ > 0;















(23) B￿ = (w￿ ￿ c￿)er￿￿ + (cT￿ ￿ wT￿) > 0;
where wT￿ = we￿r(T￿￿) and cT￿ = ￿(c￿)eg(T￿￿):
A diagrammatic solution to the migrant￿ s problem is provided in Fig.
1. The BB schedule represents the budget constraint (11￿ ), with the slope
dc￿=d￿ jBB= ￿B￿=Bc￿ > 0: Anywhere above the BB schedule the migrant￿ s
implied consumption path violates the budget constraint, while anywhere
below BB, the migrant￿ s lifetime earnings are not completely spent. Equa-
tion (10￿ ) is depicted by the G = 0 schedule with the slope dc￿=d￿ jG=0=
￿G￿=Gc￿: For ￿ = 0; Gc￿ > 0: However, as ￿ increases along the G = 0
locus, Gc￿ diminishes in magnitude, while G￿ increases, resulting in a con-
cave G = 0 schedule, which intersects BB before Gc￿ becomes negative.
Accordingly, Gc￿ is positive in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Any-
where to the right of the G = 0 locus, utility of the migrant is increased
by returning earlier to the source country. Anywhere to the left, it pays
to stay longer abroad. Accordingly, maximization of utility, consistent with
the budget constraint, takes place at the point of intersection between the
BB and G = 0 schedules.
Our simulations determine the equilibrium value of ￿ for various magni-
tudes of the exogenous variables, w￿ and r ; but also parameters of the utility
function, ￿ and ￿. For the purpose of this exercise, we shall initially assume
that w = 1; r￿ = :03; ￿ = 1:2; and consider what, on the basis of our earlier
discussion, are empirically plausible values of r(=.03, .04, .05, .07, .09, .12,
.16, .21, and .25) and ￿(=.8, .85, .9, and .95). On the basis of evidence on
wage di⁄erentials between advanced and developing countries reported by
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001), it is
12realistic to consider the following values of w￿(=2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, and 25).
The planning horizon, T, is assumed to be 50 years. The computations of
the equilibrium values of ￿ are presented in Table 1.
What the simulations illustrate very clearly, is that for the chosen range
of parameters, an increase in w￿causes migrants to stay longer abroad. This
is in contrast to the ambiguity suggested by expression (14). Here we get
unambiguous results, because for the chosen values of ￿ < 1; the absolute
value of Bw￿=Bc￿ is smaller than that of Gw￿=Gc￿, guaranteeing that the
upward shift of the G = 0 schedule in Fig. 1, due to an increase in w￿;
is larger than that of the BB schedule. This results in higher equilibrium
values of both ￿ and c￿.14 The amount of repatriated savings can also be
shown to increase with w￿. In sum, in response to an increase in the foreign
wage, migrants stay longer abroad, repatriate a larger stock of assets, and
consume more at each point in time: Moreover, as shown in Table 1 (where
an entry NM refers to "no migration"), in some cases a higher foreign wage
may induce individuals to migrate when otherwise they would have chosen
to stay in the source country. For example, with ￿ = :95 at the bottom of
the table, for r=.04 there is no migration if the foreign wage is at 2 or 3.
However, if w￿=4, it pays to migrate for .56 years, and increasingly more for
higher values of r.
For the e⁄ect of a change in w, we recall that our comparative statics
results indicate that dc￿=dw and d￿=dw are unambiguously negative. This
is con￿rmed by the simulation results (not shown) and consistent with the
￿ndings reported in Djaji· c and Milbourne (1988) for the case of r = r￿. In
terms of Fig. 1, an increase in w shifts both schedules to the left. The magni-
tude of the shift of the G = 0 schedule (￿Gw=G￿) can be analytically shown
in the general case to be larger than that of the BB schedule (￿Bw=B￿);
implying that an increase in w encourages migrants to return earlier and save
a larger fraction of their foreign income.
We consider next the implications of a change in r. Table 1 illustrates
the interesting result that for any given ￿; an increase in r can have a positive
e⁄ect on ￿ for relatively low values of w￿ and r, while it has an unambiguous
negative e⁄ect on ￿ for higher values of these same variables. For example,
14Tables showing the simulation results concerning c￿ and the implied stock of repatri-
ated assets are available from the author on request.
13with ￿ = :85 and w￿ = 2; we observe NM in the Table for r=.03. As r
increases across the table to .07, while other variables are held constant, ￿
rises to 3.93 years and then declines to 1.99 for r=.25. This can also be seen
with the aid of Fig. 2, where an increase in r shifts both schedules down.
The magnitude of the shift of the BB schedule is ￿Br=Bc￿ and that of the
G = 0 schedule is ￿Gr=Gc￿; where Gr = A, the stock of assets accumulated
by the migrant while abroad. When w￿ is relatively low, so is A, resulting
in a relatively small downward shift of the G = 0 schedule to (G = 0)
0
1. This
makes it more likely that the intersection with B0B0 is at a higher value of ￿;
such as ￿1. Similarly, when the initial value of r is close to r￿, A is relatively
small and Gc￿ relatively large, contributing once again to the possibility that
an increase in r results in a higher equilibrium value of ￿:15 Migrants then
stay longer and save a larger fraction of their income abroad. For relatively
greater values of w￿ and r, A is larger at the point of return. The magnitude
of the downward shift of the G = 0 schedule can then exceed that of the BB




0 in Fig. 2.
The optimal duration of stay abroad then declines from ￿0 to ￿2. Intuitively,
for relatively higher values of w￿￿w and/or r￿r￿, the migrant accumulates
assets abroad at a higher rate and has a stock of assets at the point of return
that is relatively larger. The larger the stock, the more powerful is the
incentive to return sooner to the source country (relative to the incentive to
stay abroad longer and save) in response to an increase in r. We therefore
observe an inverted U-shaped relation between ￿ and r, with ￿ initially rising
and then declining as r increases relative to r￿ (=￿):
As both schedules in Fig. 2 shift down in response to an increase in
r;dc￿=dr is unambiguously negative. The decline in c￿ in response to an
increase in r re￿ ects the tendency for migrants to shift the time pro￿le of their
spending in favor of future (source-country) consumption and at the expense
of consumption abroad. The e⁄ect on c￿ is obviously more pronounced the
higher the elasticity of ICS.
15The magnitude of the shift of BB is also smaller for relatively low values of r, but as
our simulations indicate, not as much as that of the G = 0 schedule.
145 Role of Preferences and the Duration of
Stay Abroad
The larger the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (￿), the lower is
the elasticity of ICS (1/￿), and the harder it is for individuals to substitute
future for present consumption. That is, to give up utility early in life by
going abroad to save for the purpose of investing the accumulated savings
in the source country and enjoying more consumption in the future. We
therefore observe in Table 1, for any given values of w￿ and r; a consistently
negative relationship between ￿ and ￿: It is interesting to note that, not
only does a lower ￿ entail a longer stay, but it can also induce temporary
migration to occur under market conditions that result in no migration (NM)
for somewhat higher values of ￿: For example, with ￿ = :95 towards the
bottom of the table, there is no migration for a range of relatively low values
of w￿ and r. With ￿ = :9 or .85, we ￿nd NM only for w￿=2, while for ￿ = :8;
temporary migration of at least some duration occurs for all values of w￿ and
r displayed in the table.
Another key parameter of the utility function is ￿ > 1; re￿ ecting the
migrant￿ s preference for consumption in the source country. Preference for
consumption at home deters workers from emigrating and draws them back
home when migration does take place. The e⁄ect is very similar to that re-
sulting from a commodity-price di⁄erential that makes consumption of any
given bundle of goods cheaper in the source country. In the context of the
present model, however, there is another motive for return: To bene￿t from
a higher yield on repatriated assets. As we have seen above, the higher the
value of r relative to r￿, the greater the cost of remaining abroad with ac-
cumulated savings and not taking advantage of the high-yielding investment
opportunities at home. What is interesting about this motive for return, in
contrast to that associated with ￿ > 1; is that the positive gap between r
and r￿(= ￿) not only serves to draw migrants back to the source country once
they have a stock of savings abroad, but it also encourages them to migrate
in the ￿rst place so as to initiate asset accumulation. It turns out to be a
powerful motive for emigration, identi￿ed in some of the literature cited in
the Introduction, as well as a motive for return.
The intuition behind this is straightforward, although somewhat subtle.
As noted at the end of Section 4, a high rate of return on investment in
15the source country (relative to ￿ = r￿) encourages individuals to postpone
consumption into the future. The advantage of consuming at home, where
the utility of consuming any given bundle of goods is relatively higher, is
then less signi￿cant for workers at the beginning of their planning horizon.
At that point they are intensive savers (and more intensive, the lower the
value of ￿), making the loss of utility associated with working and consuming
abroad relatively small in comparison with the bene￿t of accumulating assets
by working and saving in a high-wage economy. An increase in the value of
r relative to r￿ therefore lowers the attractiveness of staying permanently at
home and encourages workers to migrate temporarily abroad. At the same
time it encourages those working abroad to return sooner with accumulated
savings so as to take advantage of the attractive investment opportunities in
the source country.
In sum, migration decisions in the context of the present model, re￿ ect
the interaction between the preference for consuming at home (￿ > 1); and
the opportunities available in both the labor and capital markets of the two
countries. When r ￿ r￿ is large, it encourages workers to emigrate, save
intensively while abroad, and return to the source country to take advantage
of the high rate of return on repatriated savings. A high value of ￿; on
the other hand, discourages out-migration and encourages return of those
who do migrate, while a large w￿ relative to w, encourages emigration and a
longer (sometimes permanent) stay abroad.
The interactions among these key variables for given values of w and r￿
are illustrated in Table 2, where the equilibrium values of ￿ are now displayed
for various values of ￿; between 1.1 and 1.5, and a somewhat narrower range
of values of ￿;w￿ and r in relation to those displayed in Table 1. What we
observe is that the greater the value of ￿ in the second column of Table 2,
the more likely it is that for any given values of ￿;w￿ and r; migration does
not take place. This is indicated by NM (no migration). Moreover, when
migration does occur for a given set of values of ￿;w￿ and r, the entries in the
table indicate that the length of stay abroad diminishes with an increase in ￿.
We also observe that when ￿ is relatively low (e.g., ￿=1.1), and ￿ relatively
small (￿ = .80, .85) migrants do not return to the source country (indicated
by NR in Table 2) if w￿ is relatively large. For any ￿ > 1; however, the pull
back to the source country is stronger, the larger the value of ￿: As ￿ rises
from .80 towards .95, we thus observe in Table 2 (as well as in Table 1) a
16tendency for migrants to stay a shorter time abroad (or not to migrate at all
when w￿ is relatively low).16 In addition, it can be easily veri￿ed that the
proportion of foreign income saved is larger with a higher value of ￿ as the
expenditure pattern shifts in favor of consumption in the source country.
What Table 2 illustrates, in addition, is the point made earlier that an
increase in r can induce temporary migration when it otherwise would not
occur. For example, in any row where NM appears for a low value (or
values) of r, there is an equilibrium value of ￿ > 0 for higher values of r:
Higher values of r are also seen to encourage migrants to return with accu-
mulated savings when otherwise they would prefer the "no return" option.
For example, with w￿ = 5; ￿ = 1:1; and ￿ = :80 or :85; there is no return
(NR) when r is relatively small (i.e., r =.03 and .05). For higher values
of r, however, migrants return with accumulated savings to take advantage
of the investment opportunities in the source country. In fact for r=.25,
rather than choosing NR, they stay abroad for a short period of time (i.e.,
￿ is equal to roughly 3.5 years). In sum, an increase in the rate of return
on investment in the source country stimulates interest in temporary migra-
tion on the part of those who would otherwise prefer not to migrate, while
also encouraging return migration of those who would have otherwise stayed
permanently abroad.
It would be interesting to conduct an empirical investigation and test
whether indeed temporary migration is more frequent from those developing
countries where small businesses enjoy higher rates of return on investment,
but face credit constraints due to lack of development of local ￿nancial mar-
kets. One might envisage a cross-country analysis with the proportion of the
country￿ s labor force taking part in temporary migration as the dependent
variable and the expected rate of return on entrepreneurial activity and a
measure of access to credit as the regressors. Another key prediction of the
model is the inverse U-shaped relationship between ￿ and r.17 Ideally, one
16Note that the utility from consuming the source country wage (w=1) is simply ￿=(1￿
￿); while the ￿ ow of utility enjoyed by a permanent migrant is u￿ = w￿(1￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿):
For the two utilities to be equal, the foreign wage would have to take on the value w￿ =
￿1=(1￿￿): For ￿ = 1:2; this amounts to 2.48 when ￿ = :80; 3.37 when ￿ = :85; 6.19 when
￿ = :90; and 38.33 when ￿ = :95: Thus the greater the value of ￿; the higher must be the
value of w￿ to attract permanent migrants from the low-wage source country. As Table
2 illustrates, the results are qualitatively similar in the case of temporary migrants.
17This hypothesis can be tested in a quadratic regression model where the quadratic
17would like to conduct a cross-country analysis, explaining the variations in
the average duration of stay of temporary migrants by the di⁄erences be-
tween the expected rates of return on investments at home, as well as the
gaps between wages in the host and source countries. Unfortunately, as noted
in footnote 4, data on rates of return in the developing countries is sporadic
at best, while availability of evidence on the duration of foreign stay of tem-
porary migrants is even more limited. Any serious empirical analysis of the
predictions of our model will have to wait until these data problems are
resolved.
6 Concluding Remarks
The theoretical literature on consumption and duration-of-stay decisions of
temporary migrants has focused primarily on the role of international wage
di⁄erentials, price level di⁄erentials, human capital accumulation objectives,
consumption preferences, and family commitments of migrants as the prin-
cipal factors explaining behavior. Numerous other variables, however, may
a⁄ect their key decisions. As suggested in the Introduction, return migration
is often linked to the prospect of investing the savings accumulated abroad at
an attractive rate of return in the source country. While other studies, both
theoretical and empirical, have incorporated to some extent this motive into
their analysis of international migration, none of them has looked explicitly
at how the expected rate of return on investment at home a⁄ects the optimal
saving and duration of stay decisions. Moreover, they have not examined
how an increase in the expected rate of return triggers temporary migration
or converts permanent into temporary migration. Thus the new element
in this paper is an explicit analysis of how di⁄erences in investment oppor-
tunities across countries a⁄ect temporary migration and saving behavior of
utility-maximizing agents.
The paper also illustrates the interaction between two important motives
for return migration. Preference for consumption in the source country
and a positive rate-of-return di⁄erential in favor of investment in the source
country. It is interesting to note that the ￿rst motive pulls the migrants back
to their country of origin or prevents them from leaving in the ￿rst place,
term is multiplied by a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the wage and
interest di⁄erentials are below a certain pre-speci￿ed threshold and 0 if they are above.
18while the second motive encourages workers to migrate, but discourages them
from staying abroad for a long period of time. Our analysis shows that the
duration of stay abroad should exhibit an inverted U-shaped relation to the
rate of return (r) on investment in the source country. For low values of
the international wage and interest rate di⁄erentials, it is found that an
increase in r has a positive e⁄ect on the duration of stay abroad, while
having a negative e⁄ect for higher values of these same variables. Moreover,
it is shown that an increase in r may trigger temporary migration when it
otherwise would not take place. It may also trigger return when migration
would have otherwise been permanent.
There are possible policy implications that follow from the theoretical
analysis of this paper. For example, host countries that rely on immigra-
tion to meet short-term shortages in the labor market, but wish to avoid
permanent immigration, would ￿nd it in their interest to recruit temporary
migrants from developing countries where (a) entrepreneurs are liquidity con-
strained in an environment characterized by high expected rates of return
on small business investments and (b) where cultural, climatic, and cost-
of-living di⁄erences between the host and source countries tend to attract
migrants back home once they have accumulated the desired stock of assets.
The analysis of this paper suggests that in the presence of such conditions
migrants have a greater incentive to return, reducing the likelihood of perma-
nent settlement in the host country. Another implication of the model is that
a policy of addressing credit and liquidity constraints that face potential mi-
grants in the developing countries will not necessarily result in an increase in
the ￿ ow of migration. As pointed out in the literature, liquidity constraints,
on the one hand, prevent many workers in the developing countries from re-
alizing their migration plans. At the same time, our analysis suggests that
liquidity constraints can also encourage others to develop such plans. Thus
the impact on the ￿ ow of emigration associated with an improvement in the
e¢ ciency of credit markets in a source country is likely to be ambiguous.18
18Moreover, ￿nancial development can a⁄ect migration intentions in a number of sub-
tle ways that go beyond the structure of the present model. See Docquier and Rapoport
(2006) for a survey of the related literature and Rapoport (2002) for an interesting dynamic
model of inequality, occupational choice and growth in an economy where individuals face
liquidity constrains in ￿nancing migration as well as access to entrepreneurship. They
present conditions under which migration and remittances give descendents of migrants
access to entrepreneurship and allow the economy to move out of an initial underdevelop-
ment trap to an e¢ cient long-run equilibrium.
19Appendix
Partial derivatives of G
From eq. (10), the partial derivatives of G with respect to the key vari-
ables of the model are
(A1) Gc￿ = (r ￿ r￿) @A
@c￿ + ￿
c￿[w￿ ￿ c￿ ￿ w + ￿(c￿)] ￿ ￿
c￿(r ￿ r￿)A R 0
(A2) G￿ = (r ￿ r￿)(w￿ ￿ c￿)er￿￿ > 0;








(A4) Gw = 1;
(A5) Gr = A > 0;
In eq. (A1), we note that Gc￿ is of ambiguous sign. Holding everything
else constant, an increase in c￿ lowers A, thus lowering the opportunity cost
of staying abroad and not investing accumulated assets in the home country
at a relatively higher rate of return. This e⁄ect is captured by the ￿rst
term which contributes to a negative Gc￿: An increase in c￿ also lowers the
marginal utility of consumption and thus the utility value of the increase in
wealth [w￿ ￿ c￿ ￿ w + ￿(c￿)] associated with staying longer abroad. This
corresponds to the second term and contributes to a positive value of Gc￿:
Finally, the utility value of not investing accumulated savings in the source
country also falls with an increase in c￿: This has a negative impact on G;
as represented by the third term. Note that the combined e⁄ect of the last
two terms is positive, as implied by condition (8), and needs to be compared
with the ￿rst, negative, term to determine the sign of Gc￿.
G￿ in (A2), which is simply (r ￿ r￿)@A
@￿ ; has a positive value. That is,
postponing return to a later date raises G by extending the period of asset
accumulation and increasing the stock of assets of which a proportion (r￿r￿)
is sacri￿ced by staying longer abroad. An increase in w￿, however, seems to
have an ambiguous e⁄ect on G. As shown in (A3), there is the negative,






] as an increase in w￿ results in a higher A, of which a pro-
portion (r ￿ r￿) is forfeited by staying abroad. Since it would never pay to
20stay abroad to the point where the forgone earnings on accumulated assets
exceed the rate of asset accumulation, w￿ ￿ c￿; at the optimal ￿ it must be





(w￿ ￿ c￿) so that Gw￿ < 0: As for
an increase in w in (A4); it obviously raises the gain from returning to the
source country a moment sooner. The e⁄ect of a higher r is also positive, as
shown in (A5), because an increase in the source-country rate of return on
accumulated assets increases the urgency of return.
Partial derivatives of B
From eq. (11), the partial derivatives of B with respect to the key vari-
ables of the model are














(A7) B￿ = (w￿ ￿ c￿)er￿￿ + (cT￿ ￿ wT￿) > 0




















g2 ) R 0;
where wT￿ = we￿r(T￿￿) and cT￿ = ￿(c￿)eg(T￿￿):
An increase in c￿ unambiguously tightens the migrant￿ s budget constraint,
as shown in (A6). It reduces the stock of assets accumulated abroad (the
￿rst term in the brackets) and increases spending after return (the second
term) by shifting the entire time path of post-return consumption upward, as
implied by eq. (9). As for an increase in ￿; it relaxes the migrant￿ s budget
constraint, as stated in (A7). It lengthens the period of saving (abroad)
and shortens the period of overspending (at home). Similarly, the e⁄ect of
an increase in w￿ or w on the budget constraint is unambiguously positive,
as indicated in (A8) and (A9). The e⁄ect of an increase in r; shown in
(A10), is ambiguous. While an increase in r lowers the present (time-￿)
value of wages received in the home country, it may either lower or raise
the time-￿ value of the migrant￿ s post-return consumption stream. This
can be seen by recalling that nominal consumption in the source country
21grows at the proportional rate r￿r￿
￿ ; while discounted consumption grows
at the rate g = r￿r￿
￿ ￿ r, which is positively related to r when 1=￿ > 1:
Thus for 1=￿ > 1; Br is unambiguously negative, as the present value of
the migrant￿ s post-return labor income shrinks while that of consumption
spending expands. For 1=￿ < 1; however, one cannot rule out the possibility
that Br > 0: For a su¢ ciently large value of ￿; Br > 0; as may be seen by
evaluating Br as ￿ ! 1 and noting that ￿(c￿) > w; and that g ! ￿r as
￿ ! 1:19 Since empirical evidence suggests that ￿ is not likely to be very
large in relation to 1, we shall take Br < 0 to be the relevant case. Note
that Br < 0 is a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for dc￿=dr < 0 in
eq. (18).
E⁄ects of a change in w￿ on ￿ and c￿
The ambiguous sign of d￿=dw￿ in (14 ) stems from the interaction between
the income and substitution e⁄ects of an increase in w￿. On the one hand, an
increase in the foreign wage relaxes the budget constraint (Bw￿ > 0): This
contributes to a decline in ￿ as it enables the migrant to achieve a given con-
sumption program with a shorter stay abroad. On the other hand, recalling
that Gw￿ < 0; an increase in w￿ makes staying abroad more rewarding by
increasing the migrant￿ s rate of asset accumulation at any given c￿. Because
this lowers G, c￿ must increase to reduce the marginal utility of consumption
and hence the utility value of the higher savings rate so as to maintain G = 0.
This increase in c￿ has a negative, indirect impact on the migrant￿ s budget,
amounting to Bc￿Gw￿=Gc￿. If the degree of concavity of the utility function,
￿, is relatively high, the increase in consumption needed to restore G = 0
after an increase in w￿ is relatively small. In that case d￿=dw￿ < 0 as the
direct e⁄ect on the budget, Bw￿, dominates the indirect e⁄ect, Bc￿Gw￿=Gc￿.
For ￿ < 1, the increase in consumption is larger and the indirect e⁄ect domi-
nates. This is shown in our simulations in Section 4, where we consider values
of ￿ in the range between .80 and .95. The migrant then stays longer abroad
in response to an increase in w￿ in order to pay for the optimal consumption
program.
19Note that both expressions in the brackets of (21) are positive, the second one being
so regardless of the sign of g.
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Table1. Equilibrium values of τ for various values of θ, w*, and r when α=1.2, r* =.03 and w = 1  
 
Rate of Return on Investment in the Source Country (r)  θ w* 
r =.03  r =.04 r=.05  r=.07  r=.09  r=.12  r=.16  r=.21  r=.25 
2  5.06  6.57  6.72 6.03 5.18 4.16 3.23 2.50 2.11 
3  20.02  16.36  13.66  10.12  7.96 5.99 4.48 3.40 2.84 
4  27.00  21.29  17.16  12.14  9.32 6.90 5.09 3.83 3.20 
5  31.13  24.38  19.32  13.36  10.14  7.43 5.46 4.10 3.41 
7  35.84  28.12  21.89  14.76  11.07  8.04 5.88 4.39 3.65 
10 39.40  31.19  23.93  15.82  11.77  8.49 6.18 4.61 3.83 





25 44.45  36.28  27.04  17.34  12.74  9.12 6.61 4.92 4.09 
           
2  NM 1.66 3.12 3.93 3.87 3.43 2.85 2.31 1.99 
3  10.64  10.04  9.27 7.78 6.58 5.27 4.12 3.21 2.73 
4  16.12  13.97  12.22  9.66 7.91 6.17 4.74 3.66 3.09 
5  19.24  16.28  13.98  10.77  8.70 6.71 5.11 3.93 3.31 
7  22.67  18.88  15.97  12.03  9.59 7.31 5.53 4.23 3.56 
10 25.18  20.84  17.47  12.98  10.25  7.76 5.85 4.45 3.74 





25 28.61  23.58  19.58  14.30  11.18  8.39 6.28 4.77 4.00 
           
2  NM NM NM 1.17 1.93 2.22 2.13 1.89 1.70 
3  2.56 3.90 4.50 4.74 4.53 4.03 3.41 2.81 2.45 
4  7.04 7.19 7.05 6.45 5.78 4.91 4.03 3.26 2.82 
5  9.53 9.07 8.52 7.46 6.53 5.44 4.40 3.53 3.04 
7  12.22  11.14  10.18  8.59 7.37 6.03 4.82 3.84 3.29 
10 14.15  12.65  11.39  9.43 7.99 6.47 5.13 4.07 3.48 





25 16.72  14.70  13.05  10.58  8.85 7.08 5.56 4.38 3.74 
           
2  NM NM NM NM NM 0.07 0.67 0.91 0.97 
3  NM NM NM 0.68 1.38 1.80 1.91 1.83 1.72 
4  NM 0.56 1.38 2.21 2.54 2.63 2.51 2.27 2.09 
5  1.29 2.14 2.65 3.11 3.22 3.13 2.87 2.54 2.31 
7  3.48 3.86 4.04 4.11 3.98 3.69 3.28 2.84 2.56 
10  5.04 5.10 5.06 4.84 4.55 4.11 3.59 3.07 2.74 













 Table 2. Equilibrium values of τ for various values of θ, α, w*, and r, when r* =.03 and w = 1. 
 
 
      Rate of Return on Investment in the Source Country (r) 
θ  α  w*  r =.03  r =.05  r =0.7  r =.12  r =.25 
2 47.8363  18.3136  10.5255  5.1239  2.2003 
3 NR  NR  16.3055  7.0892 2.9327 
 
1.1 
5 NR  NR  22.2321  8.6456 3.5065 
2  5.0629 6.7291 6.0394 4.1656 2.1149 
3 20.0287  13.6627  10.1227  5.9967  2.8412 
 
1.2 
5 31.1310  19.3268  13.3636  7.4310  3.4149 
2 NM  2.9999 3.9398 3.5309 2.0538 
3  9.3658 8.7189 7.5592 5.2887 2.7740 
 
1.3 
5 17.0441  13.0096  10.3363  6.6559  3.3417 
2 NM  NM  1.8524 2.7435 1.9562 










5  8.9447 8.3954 7.5653 5.7159 3.2318 
2  19.2230  11.8866  8.3527 4.6844 2.1515 
3 48.7640  22.7814  13.4308  6.6742  2.8961 
 
1.1 
5 NR  NR  17.8741  8.2428 3.4882 
2 NM  3.1219 3.9398 3.4332 1.9928 
3  10.6476  9.2743 7.7850 5.2765 2.7313 
 
1.2 
5 19.2413  13.9801  10.7758  6.7108  3.3112 
2 NM  0.0275 1.9318 2.6642 1.8707 
3  3.8300 5.3925 5.4169 4.4220 2.6031 
 
1.3 
5  10.6598  9.3292 8.0658 5.7892 3.1769 
2  NM  NM  NM  1.7548     1.6998   










5  5.1056 5.6854 5.5878 4.7211 2.9877 
2  2.5604 5.3925 5.1849 3.7750 2.0050 
3  18.3624  12.7594  9.5612 5.7465 2.7679 
 
1.1 
5 30.4047  18.8629  13.0707  7.2906  3.3722 
2 NM  NM  1.1749 2.2247 1.7059 
3  2.5665 4.5013 4.7455 4.0375 2.4567 
 
1.2 
5  9.5367 8.5297 7.4615 5.4413 3.0487 
2 NM  NM  NM  1.3519 1.4923 
3 NM  1.7181 2.7496 3.0853 2.2369 
 
1.3 
5  4.7333 5.3314 5.2399 4.4220 2.8168 
2 NM  NM  NM  0.3876 1.2054 










5  1.3397 2.7374 3.2440 3.3234 2.5055 
2 NM  NM  0.3998 1.7670 1.5106 
3  1.2909 3.5919 4.0558 3.6285 2.2858 
 
1.1 
5  8.3832 7.7057 6.8390 5.0751 2.8900 
2 NM  NM  NM  0.0763 0.9735 
3 NM  NM  0.6866 1.8036 1.7242 
 
1.2 
5  1.2909 2.6520 3.1158 3.1342 2.3102 
2  NM NM NM NM  0.6317 
3 NM  NM  NM  0.9308 1.3702 
 
1.3 
5 NM  0.9308 1.6876 2.2186 1.9501 
2  NM NM NM NM  0.2350 











5 NM  NM  0.4486 1.3214 1.5289 